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Respondents Thomas Jensen and Deanna Jensen, husband and wife (together, the

by and through

“Jensens”),

their attorneys

of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn

& Crapo,

P.L.L.C.,

’

hereby submit Respondents Brief

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

I.

A. Nature 0f the Case.

Can

a landowner claim a natural servitude through a

N0.

neighbors’ property?

man-made

ditch crossing their

Natural servitudes exist to allow water from an upper property t0

naturally drain onto a lower property.

Ditches are dug t0 utilize gravity t0 artiﬁcially

move

water from one place to another. The owner of upper property cannot use the doctrine of natural
servitudes t0 claim an interest in a

claims for damages

When

there

is

man-made
no basis

ditch through lower property in order t0 shoehorn

t0 claim

an easement in the

ditch.

Yet

that is

what

this appeal is about.

Appellant Lora K. Roberts

ﬂooding

that occurred in or about

(“M”) brought

this case, asserting claims arising out

0f

February 2017 0n property Roberts owns (referred t0 as the

“Roberts Property”)1 and out 0f the Jensens’ actions ﬁlling in the portion of a ditch on their
property (referred to as the

“

ensen Property”)?

The

ditch that crosses the Roberts Property, a public street

ditch

0n the Jensen Property

is

part 0f a

between the properties (Sunnyside Drive),

the Jensen Property, as well as three other lots in the Sunnyside Acres subdivision (the full ditch

The Roberts Property

is

described in the

The Jensen Property
property

is

is

described in the

legally described as Lot 35,

“46 Sunnyside Drive in Jerome, Idaho, Which
Sunnyside Acres, Jerome County, Idaho.” (Second Amended

Amended Complaint

property is legally described as Lot 5, Block
Clerk’s Record on Appeal (“g”) at 387).

1,

as:

“51 Sunnyside Drive in Jerome, Idaho, Which
Sunnyside Acres, Jerome County, Idaho.” (R. at 387).

Amended Complaint as:
Block

2,
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1

is

referred to as the

“Waste Ditch”).

Sunnyside Acres subdivision (the
This case comes

down

t0

The course 0f

“MW.
What

the

Waste Ditch

is

depicted in the plat of

(See R. at 17, 222).

right 0r interest Roberts has in the

claims for trespass, nuisance, and declaratory judgment

all

ultimately

Waste Ditch. Roberts’

come down

t0

whether 0r

not Roberts has any right t0 the Waste Ditch, because Roberts can have no claim for any

damages or declaration

The

to use.

case,

if the

District Court

Jensens prevented Roberts from using a ditch that she has no right

found that the doctrine of natural servitudes does not apply to

and correctly dismissed Roberts’ Amended Complaint. Now, 0n appeal, the

must be afﬁrmed because Roberts has no basis

for

any

interest in the

Waste

District

this

Court

Ditch.

B. Statement 0f Facts.

There

is

no evidence

water naturally drained in

because the land
(R. at 52).

1).

this area

“is generally

0f When the Waste Ditch was created or

without the Waste Ditch.

ﬂat with

many

From

Which

this

is

“Where the culvert

“low point”

in the

is

surface

The Waste Ditch was necessary
(1%) slope.”

t0 “the

10W point 0n

now

collect at

and run

located underneath Sunnyside Drive.”

property—which now

Property and the Roberts Property—water would
(R. at 41

how

areas having less than a one percent

The area was farmed, and surface water would

the property,”

41

in the record

lies at the

(R. at

roadway between the Jensen

ﬂow through the Waste

Ditch t0 the southwest.

1).

In 1978,

Donald E. and Lola Sonius, together with Agricultural Development,

Pension Plan, ﬁled and recorded the Plat in Jerome County, Idaho.

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF—PAGE 2

Inc.

(R. at 222-23, 237, 251).

The 1978

Plat depicts the

Waste Ditch

as an already-existing ditch passing through lots in the

Sunnyside Acres subdivision (the “Subdivision”). (R.

at 222).

In 2001, Roberts purchased the Roberts Property.

took the Roberts Property “subject t0

Her deed notes

(R. at 239).

Waste Ditch] running through

[the] existing ditch [i.e., the

property t0 remain open for waste water from farm North of property,”

Farm. (R.

at

that she

z'.e.,

for the

Van Beck

239 (emphasis added». However, Roberts did not keep the Waste Ditch open, but

“ran an arena groomer over the area” (R. at 507 (Answer No. 15, relating to Request for

Admission N0.

1)),

and “obliterated” the Waste Ditch, Which Roberts claims was replaced by “a

depression 0r swale Where the ditch previously existed.”

(R. at 65

(1]

4);

but see R.

at

153-54,

177 (showing pictures 0f the former location of the Waste Ditch 0n the Roberts Property without

any such depression or swale)). The Waste Ditch was similarly obliterated 0n the property above
(up—ditch from) the Roberts Property and

65

4,

(1]

stating that the

below (down-ditch from) the Jensen Property.

Waste Ditch 0n

his property,

which

is

up-ditch from the Roberts

Property, has also been obliterated); see also R. at 153-55, 179-80 (showing the properties

ditch

down-

from the Jensen Property».

By

2010, the only remaining portion of the former Waste Ditch was the portion that

crossed the Jensen Property. (See R. at 150, 153-55 (1m 6 and 18); R.

purchased the Jensen Property in 2010. (R.

at

19),

208 (1m 24-25), 153-54

(1]

18),

at

205

(1]

The Jensens

5)).

149-50, 166-67). Like their neighbors (including

Roberts), the Jensens ﬁlled in the portion of the

(1]

(R. at

Waste Ditch 0n

the Jensen Property.

(R. at

207

176-80 (pictures of the location 0f the obliterated ditch),

156 (1N 22-23)). Thus, in 2013, the Jensens added

soil to the

Waste Ditch
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“to level

it

off With the

surrounding land” because the topography on the Jensen Property increases in elevation and the
Waste Ditch deeply incised the property for water to flow. (R. at 156 (¶ 22)). In doing so, it is
important to note that the Jensens “did not increase the grade, gradient, elevation, or level of the
Jensen Property, [but] only filled in the course of the Waste Ditch to match the surrounding
portions of the Jensen Property.” (R. at 156 (¶ 23)). This means that the Jensens, essentially,
restored the Jensen Property back to its natural state, as it existed prior to the Waste Ditch.
There were no problems until years later when Jerome County was struck with extreme
weather and circumstances. In February 2017, as Deanna Jensen has explained:
the weather was very unusual. While there was still a large amount of
snow on the ground and the ground was still frozen, the temperatures
raised suddenly and, in February 2017, we experienced a heavy rain storm.
These circumstances produced large amounts of sheet flooding—where
rainwater and melting snow flow over the ground, which is still frozen
(preventing the water from soaking into the ground), leading to the
accumulation of flood waters on low points in the land.
The abnormal combination of snow, rapid warming, and heavy rain in
February 2017, produced a flood that affected several properties in
Sunnyside Acres, including the Jensen Property and the Roberts Property.
(R. at 156 (paragraph numbering omitted)). The flooding in the Subdivision affecting the
Roberts Property and Jensen Property was extreme.

(See R. at 157-61, 181-200).

This

extraordinary flooding was “unique and singular” and “could not be entirely anticipated, guarded
against, or resisted.” (R. at 161-63). In fact, it triggered emergency declarations from both the
State of Idaho and the Federal Government. (See R. at 218-19, 295-331).
This extraordinary flooding event in February 2017, which lasted for weeks, impacted the
Roberts Property, the Jensen Property, and other neighbors.
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C. Course of Proceedings.
Roberts filed her initial Complaint on January 28, 2018. (R. at 11). Roberts’ initial
Complaint did not mention natural servitudes at all, but asserted claims for trespass and nuisance
and also sought a declaratory judgment that the Waste Ditch was an easement of which the
Roberts Property was the dominant estate and the Jensen Property was the servient estate. (See
R. at 11-16). On March 2, 2018, the Jensens responded with an Answer and Counterclaim.
(R. at 20). The Jensens’ counterclaim asked the Court to order Roberts to clear the Waste Ditch
on the Roberts Property if Roberts were entitled to any relief from the Jensens. (R. at 22-24).
Shortly thereafter, the Jensens secured alternative counsel and filed a Notice of Substitution of
Counsel on March 27, 2018. (R. at 28-30).
On April 11, 2018, Roberts filed a motion for summary judgment, supporting
memorandum, and three affidavits (including one from an expert, Charles Brockway). (R. at 3153). In the following days, Roberts submitted two more affidavits. (R. at 54-66). In response,
the Jensens filed motions to dismiss the Complaint (R. at 82-102), strike the affidavits (R. at 6781), continue proceedings on summary judgment (R. at 101-126), submit an amended answer
and counterclaim to reflect the theories of the Jensens’ new counsel (R. at 332-352), and
opposition to Roberts’ motion for summary judgment together with three supporting declarations
(R. at 127-331). At the hearing on all of these motions, the District Court allowed the Jensens to
file Jensens’ Amended Answer and Counterclaims, which was done on May 15, 2018 (R. at
365), and delayed consideration of all the other motions.
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Thereafter, the parties stipulated to allow Roberts to ﬁle an

Roberts”

380).

Amended Complaint was ﬁled on June

5,

amended complaint.

(R. at

2018, and was the ﬁrst time Roberts”

pleadings asserted an interest in the Waste Ditch by Virtue of a natural servitude. (See R. at 387393).

On
the

June 22, 2018 (before the Jensens were required t0 ﬁle their responsive pleading t0

Amended

more

Complaint), Roberts again ﬁled a Motion for

afﬁdavits.

the parties

(R. at 394-415).

had ﬁled

all

Roberts’ Motion for

Summary Judgment drew

of the responsive and counter-responsive pleadings.

Roberts later ﬁled three more afﬁdavits. (R.

On

Summary Judgment along With

at

July 30, 2018, the Jensens ﬁled Jensens’ Motion for

renewed (and updated)

(R. at 559-577)

and

motions t0

to dismiss the

responded t0

parties

their

all

out until after

(R. at 416-431).

529-558).

Summary Judgment, and

supporting material, including one additional declaration (R. at 432-528).
also

strike portions

Amended Complaint

the

Later, the Jensens

0f the afﬁdavits submitted by Roberts

per Rule 12(b)(7) (R. at 578-591). The

0f the pending motions, including the cross motions for summary

judgment, and the Jensens submitted a declaration from their expert, Ryan Christensen.

(R. at

Roberts also submitted a motion to strike a portion of one of the declarations the

592-638).

Jensens had submitted (R. at 639-641), but later withdrew this motion

The
Transcript),

at 693).

three

District

Court heard oral argument on

and issued

its

decision (the

all

at the

hearing (R. at 698).

of the motions 0n August 27, 2018 (See

“Memorandum

Decision”) on September 27, 2018.

(R.

There, the District Court partially granted the Jensens’ motion t0 strike, largely as t0

portions of fact Witness

afﬁdavits

submitted by Roberts that were either hearsay or an
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unqualified attempt to present expert opinion. (R. at 698-700). The District Court considered
both parties’ experts, Dr. Brockway and Dr. Christensen. (R. at 701-703). But, given that “in
2017 there was an extraordinary event of snow accumulation; rain; and rapid snow meld that had
not been seen for years” and that “[f]looding was common throughout the Magic Valley and
other areas,” found a key deficiency in the experts opinions, which did not address “the amount
of snow accumulation and rain that occurred in February, 2017”; “the amount of water generated
by the rain and rapid snow melt”; or “the ability of the culvert [under Sunnyside Drive] to pass
water through it based on the sedimentation in the culvert as well as the restricted openings of
the culvert at each end.” (R. at 702-703). Because “Sunnyside Drive was and is an obstruction
to the flow of water” (R. at 702), those questions were key and the experts did not address them,
the District Court disregarded all of the expert testimony. (R. at 703). Finally, the District Court
held that “the doctrine of natural servitude does not apply to this case,” that there could be no
trespass because the Jensens did not intrude or invade the Roberts Property, no nuisance because
Roberts has no interest to assert in the Waste Ditch, and Roberts had not made a claim for
negligence. (R. at 707, 709, 711-12). As a result, the District Court granted summary judgment
on the Jensens’ behalf. (R. at 713).
On October 11, 2018, Roberts timely sought reconsideration of the District Court’s
Memorandum Decision, largely based on a notice pleading theory with regard to her nuisance
claim, a possible claim for negligence (though such a claim or a motion to amend again never
materialized), and asked the District Court to reconsider its holdings regarding a natural
servitude or easement. (R. at 717-731). After the parties briefed these issues, the District Court
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determined that oral argument was unnecessary, and ﬁled
Decision”) denying the motion for reconsideration 0n
District Court noted that Roberts presented

originally presented to the court.”

[under Sunnyside Drive]

is

n0 new

(R. at 754).

November

facts,

The

may have been

property and

ﬂow

Court

still

costs.

conveyance

[sic] t0

the increase in ﬂooding.”

its

(R. at

Amended Judgment,

(R. at 763-764).

Roberts has appealed t0 this Court from the

Memorandum

Decision, the Reconsideration

Amended Judgment.

ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL.

II.

A. Are the Jensens

entitled to

an award 0f attorney fees on appeal under Idaho Code

III.

When reviewing

a

J-U-B Eng’rs,

Inc.

summary judgment

v.

§

12-121?

STANDARD OF REVIEW.

same standard used below.” Wyman

62 (2008)).

found that “the culvert

intended and that water would customarily pond 0n [Roberts’]

Also 0n November 30, 2018, the District Court also issued

Decision, and the

The

over Sunnyside Drive in years prior to the ditch being ﬁlled in by Jensen. The

awarding the Jensens

(citing

30, 2018. (R. at 752-762).

but merely “reargue[d] the same facts

District

extreme snow accumulation in 2017 clearly attributed

the

decision (the “Reconsideration

in such a condition that [the] culvert could not handle the

of water as

755).

its

v.

decision, this Court has explained that

“employs

Eck, 161 Idaho 723, 725, 390 P.3d 449, 451 (2017)

Sec. Ins. C0. ofHartford, 146 Idaho 31

“The court must grant summary judgment

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
law.” Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(a). In analyzing

it

if the

is

1,

314-15, 193 P.3d 858, 861-

movant shows

entitled to

summary judgment,
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8

that there is

judgment

no

as a matter 0f

Court liberally construes

all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences and
conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion.” Wyman, 161
Idaho at 725, 390 P.3d at 451 (citation omitted). However, when—as here—“an action will be
tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of
the party opposing a motion for summary judgment but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at
the most probable inferences to be drawn from uncontroverted evidentiary facts.” Loomis v. City
of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 1275 (1991).
In order to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must submit more than just
conclusory assertions in response to a motion for summary judgment. In other words, “[a] mere
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material
fact.” Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306
(2000). “Instead, the nonmoving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial.” Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho
552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009) (citation omitted).
In contrast, “[t]he admission of opinion testimony, whether that of an expert or a lay
witness, is a matter committed to the trial court’s discretion. Such decisions will only be
overturned if the appellant shows an abuse of discretion.” Hull v. Giesler, 163 Idaho 247, 250,
409 P.3d 827, 830 (2018) (internal citations omitted). As this Court has recently clarified its
abuse of discretion analysis:
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
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within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018) (emphasis in original).
IV.

ARGUMENT.

Damnum absque injuria esse potest. This maxim provides the insight that “[t]here can be
such a thing as damage without injury.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1955, Appx. A (11th ed.
2019). No one denies that Roberts suffered damage—but it was damage without injury, in that
no one violated any of her rights. “It may be stated as a general proposition that every man has a
right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, and if while lawfully in such use and
enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to his neighbor,
it is ‘damnum absque injuria,’ for the rightful use of one's own land may cause damage to
another without any legal wrong.” City of Bellevue v. Daly, 14 Idaho 545, ____, 94 P. 1036,
1038 (1908) (citation omitted).

Even in the context of a nuisance claim, this Court has

recognized this centuries-old thread of jurisprudence, as:
Generally, “every man may regulate, improve, and control his own
property, may make such erections as his own judgment, taste, or interest
may suggest, and be master of his own without dictation or interference by
his neighbors, so long as the use to which he devotes his property is not in
violation of the rights of others, however much damage they may
sustain therefrom.”
McVicars v. Christensen, 156 Idaho 58, 62, 320 P.3d 948, 952 (2014), as corrected (Feb. 20,
2014) (quoting White v. Bernhart, 41 Idaho 665, 669–70, 241 P. 367, 368 (1925)) (emphasis
added). Roberts only has a claim against the Jensens if she has an interest in the Jensen Property
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with which the Jensens have interfered. Roberts recognizes that

0n an

interest in the

all

Jensen Property. (See Appellant’s Opening Bic,

of her claims are predicated
p. 8

(claiming that “Jensens’

wrongful actions in 2013 interfered With Roberts’ natural servitude damaging her property.

Consequently, Roberts has valid nuisance and trespass claims”
added»).

For that reason, the key question of

shOW—or

at least

show a genuine

this case

and

this

(citation omitted,

appeal

Whether Roberts can

is

dispute 0f material fact With regard

emphasis

to—an

interest in the

Jensen Property.
Originally, Roberts”

the Jensen Property.

Complaint claimed an easement

(R. at 14).

However,

as that claim

has—since ﬁling her Amended Complaint—pivoted
a natural servitude.

interest in the

Waste Ditch across

became increasingly untenable, Roberts

to asserting

an interest in the Waste Ditch as

Roberts’ easement arguments have been dismissed below and altogether

abandoned on appeal, rendering them precluded under the law 0f the

case.

Roberts

now

“does

not dispute that the [Waste Ditch] upstream of the Jensen [P]roperty was abandoned by Roberts’
predecessors and others.” (Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 28,
t0 not

While

this is carefully

worded

concede an abandonment 0f the Waste Ditch easement on the Jensen Property, that

conclusion

is

unavoidable; if the Waste Ditch easement was abandoned by the easement holder

upstream 0f the Jensen Property,

(e.g.,

abandoned 0n the Jensen Property.3

on the Roberts Property), then

it

has likewise been

Roberts has no easement interest under any theory—

express, implied, or prescriptive—in the

3

n. 8).

Waste Ditch.

On

appeal, the only basis asserted

by

This must be true unless the Court accepts a form 0f the “cascading easement theory” advanced below by
at 586) or some other basis for an easement—none 0f Which has been argued by Roberts 0n

Roberts (see R.

appeal, and has therefore been waived.
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Roberts that can satisfy the underlying predicate interest in the Jensen Property is that she has an
interest in the Waste Ditch pursuant to the doctrine of natural servitudes.
No one can have a natural servitude in a man-made ditch. This is because the doctrine of
natural servitudes is not and cannot be a back door to ditch rights. Without a natural servitude
interest in the Waste Ditch, there is no nuisance (see Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 29 (“Assuming
this Court finds an existing natural servitude, Roberts is entitled to pursue her nuisance claim”))
and there is no trespass (see Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 34 (“Just as landowners along a stream
cannot impede the flow in a manner to injure their neighbors [with riparian rights] so too this
premise should be extended and apply to those subject to a natural servitude”)). Because Roberts
does not have an interest in the Waste Ditch under the doctrine of natural servitudes, there is no
issue of nuisance or trespass, and any matters presented by Roberts’ expert are rendered
immaterial. The District Court must be affirmed.
A. The District Court correctly concluded that Roberts does not have a natural servitude
in the man-made Waste Ditch across the Jensen Property.
From their first inclusion in the Amended Complaint, Roberts’ claim to an interest in the
Waste Ditch under the doctrine of natural servitudes has been an attempt to shoehorn an
inapplicable doctrine into this case by creating a natural servitude out of an abandoned ditch.
There are no material facts that Roberts can genuinely dispute and the Court must determine, as a
matter of law, that the Waste Ditch is not—and was never—a natural watercourse and no natural
servitude exists with respect to the Waste Ditch.
Idaho has adopted the so-called “civil law rule” of surface waters, which “recognizes a
servitude of natural drainage between adjoining landowners.” Burgess v. Salmon River Canal
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C0.,

Ltd, 119 Idaho 299, 305, 805 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1991) (emphasis added). The emphasis 0f

the civil law rule has always been

Watercourses

-

Flood Waters

404 (1917) (“Under

-

See, e.g.,

Waters and

Accelerating Flow by Artiﬁcial Depressions, 30 Harv. L. Rev.

this rule the

right is recognized to

on allowing natural drainage.

natural course 0f drainage cannot be interfered with, and a

have surface water pass in

its

natural channels” (citation omitted,

emphasis added)). As applicable here,
Idaho adheres to the

civil

law rule

which recognizes a natural servitude

of natural drainage between adjoining lands so that the lower owner must
accept the ‘surface’ water Which naturally drains onto his land. An upper

landowner can accumulate water and release it back into its natural
watercourse.
However, the upper landowner cannot accumulate and
release water in unnatural concentrations in such a manner as to increase
the damage on the lower landowner.
Lemhz' Cty.

v.

Moulton, 163 Idaho 404, 411, 414 P.3d 226, 233 (2018) (citations and internal

quotation marks omitted, ellipsis in original); see also Smith

v.

King Creek Grazing Ass ’n, 105

Idaho 644, 647, 671 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Ct. App. 1983) (“an upper landowner had an easement of
drainage across the land 0f a lower proprietor, to the extent of water naturally

ﬂowing from

the higher ground t0 the lower tract, but that this servitude could not be augmented by acts of
the upper landowner” (emphasis added)).

The

1.

District Court correctly determined that the civil

situation,

and cannot create a natural servitude

Ditch because

The

it is

in the artiﬁcial,

t0 this

man-made Waste

not a natural drainage.

District Court recognized that all

term “natural.”

law rule was inapplicable

0f the formulations of the

civil

law rule include the

See, e.g., Burgess, 119 Idaho at 305, 805 P.2d at 1229 (the rule realizes “a

servitude 0f natural drainage” (emphasis added»; Smith, 105 Idaho
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at

647, 671 P.2d at 1110

(“an upper landowner had an easement of drainage across the land of a lower proprietor, t0 the

ﬂowing from the higher ground

extent 0f water naturally

t0 the

lower tract” (emphasis

In this appeal, the term “natural” warrants deﬁnition, because Roberts repeatedly

added)).

claims that the Waste Ditch “naturally drained surface water” from the Roberts Property and
other lands.

(Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 13).

natural servitude

However,

encompassed the ditch

for purposes

as

it

This

is

an attempt by Roberts t0 assert that “the

existed pre-2013.”

0f a natural servitude,

“[a]

(Appellant’s Opening Bic, 29).

‘natural drain’ is that course,

formed by

nature, Which waters naturally and normally follow in draining from higher t0 lower lands.” 93
C.J.S. Waters, §

257 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).

It is

true that a ditch uses natural

processes—such as the law 0f gravity—to move or convey water. But a ditch
drain, regardless

0f

how

long

it

has been in a location.

ambiguity between “natural drainage”

(116.,

drainage that

Roberts

is

is

is

not a natural

attempting t0 seize on the

formed by nature and

is

naturally and

normally followed in draining water), which cannot include a ditch, and “ﬂowing naturally”

ﬂow using natural processes

like gravity, rather than

equivalence Roberts would like t0 create does not

mechanical processes like a pump). But the
exist.

A

man-made,

artiﬁcial ditch

constitute the “natural drainage” that a natural servitude requires a lower

Moulton, 163 Idaho

at

41

1,

414 P.3d

at

carries water downhill off a property for at least twelve years.

Br., p. 14 (“water

would

still

naturally

t0 accept.

the modiﬁcation of the civil law rule proposed

Roberts, create natural servitudes through vast numbers of ditches throughout

is

owner

M

233.

T0 hold otherwise would, under

ditch

(i.e.,

ﬂow

across [Roberts’] property
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by

Idaho—any time

a

(See Appellant’s Opening
eventually through the

from 2001

ditch across the Jensen Property

ditch law.

until 2013”)).

This would have drastic impacts on

Imagine the problems a ditch owner 0r a landowner would encounter in re-locating a

ditch, as authorized

by Idaho law under Idaho Code

§

42-1207,

if

a third party had a natural

must be

servitude right therein. For this reason, the modiﬁcation Roberts advocates

Court must decline an expansion 0f the
ditches,

and the

District

civil

rej ected,

law rule that grants a natural servitude through

Court must be afﬁrmed.

Roberts cannot show that water naturally drains across the Jensen Property.

Ditch
at

is,

unsurprisingly, a ditch that

388-89 (Complaint, 1W

8, 9,

is

not a natural feature.

10, 12,

13,

On

this

14, 15 (all referring to a “ditch”)); R. at

24 (Jensens’ Second Amended Answer and Counterclaim, Answer ﬂ

alters the natural

W

13, 17 (also referring to a “ditch”))).

drainage 0f an

area.

The Waste

both parties agree. (See R.

(Complaint, Prayer for Relief, 1N 2-3 (both referring to a “ditch”)); see also R.

Defense, Counterclaim

the

See WEBSTER’S

By

its

8,

at

391-92

418, 421, 423-

Sixth Afﬁrmative

very character, a ditch

NEW WORLD DICTIONARY

427

(5th ed.

2014) (providing, in the only deﬁnition of ditch as a noun, “a long, narrow channel dug into the
earth, as a trough for drainage 0r irrigation”).

occur without artiﬁcial intervention.

A natural

servitude

must be natural—i.e.,

As explained previously by this

it

must

Court:

Water seeks its level and naturally ﬂows from a higher t0 a lower plane;
hence the lower surface, or inferior heritage, is doomed by nature to bear a
servitude t0 the higher surface, or superior heritage, in this: that

receive the water that naturally falls 0n

Loosli

alters

v.

and ﬂows from

it

must

this latter.

Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 477, 162 P.2d 393, 396—97 (1945) (emphasis added).

and expands any drainage

that

would occur between two adjoining
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properties.

A ditch

A natural

Ditches are subject to easement law and other

servitude cannot be created in an artiﬁcial ditch.

applicable areas, but natural servitudes cannot be expanded t0 encompass a ditch, as Roberts

contends. Roberts’ inability t0

Property

is fatal

show natural drainage from

to her claim to a natural servitude,

water Which naturally drains onto [the lower] land.”

One way

the Roberts Property onto the Jensen

which can only

Id.

t0 establish a natural servitude appears t0

be an adequate showing 0f a natural

watercourse ﬂowing from the upper property to the lower property.

Idaho

at

and thus a natural servitude

watercourse” (emphasis omitted».

Waste Ditch qualiﬁed

(“E”)

at

See, e.g., Moulton, 163

410, 414 P.3d at 232 (“The district court did not err in determining a natural

watercourse existed

the

exist as to “the ‘surface’

52216-5325).

this reason,

as a natural watercourse.

While Roberts implies

natural watercourse (see Appellant’s

only part of the exception t0 the
servitude»,

Perhaps for

exists for waters that drain through this

both parties argued about whether

(See R. at 446-53, Transcript 0n Appeal

that she is not arguing that the

Opening Bic, pp. 9-10 (arguing

civil

law rule and

that

it is

she has not explicitly conceded that point,

emphasizes the point that the Waste Ditch

is

Waste Ditch

is

a

that a natural watercourse is

not a necessary element of a natural
so

it

warrants consideration and

an unnatural drainage that cannot be included

Within the scope of a natural servitude.

As

a matter 0f law, the Waste Ditch—as

it

crosses the Jensen Property 0r

cannot be the natural watercourse giving rise t0 a natural servitude.

elsewhere—

Every case

that has

considered a natural servitude in Idaho has, for more than a century, considered the existence 0f
a natural watercourse.

See, e.g., Hutchinson

v.

Watson Slough Ditch C0., 16 Idaho 484, 101
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P.

1059, 1060 (1909) (finding Watson Slough, the watercourse at issue, to be natural); Scott v.
Watkins, 63 Idaho 506, ____, 122 P.2d 220, 223 (1942); Dayley v. City of Burley, 96 Idaho 101,
105, 524 P.2d 1073, 1077 (1974) (finding Goose Creek to be a natural watercourse); Loosli v.
Heseman, 66 Idaho 469, 481, 162 P.2d 393, 398–99; Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119
Idaho 299, 305, 805 P.2d 1223, 1229 (1991) (finding Salmon Falls Creek was a natural
watercourse because it “flowed unimpeded to the Snake River,” and had a “channel” with “a
substantial and constant flow of water in the original creek bed” even after being dammed);
Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (finding “Hartvigson Draw [the watercourse at issue]
is a natural watercourse”). The definition of a natural watercourse, reaffirmed in Moulton in
2018, is taken from the 1945 Loosli case, which was in turn quoting a jury instruction approved
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hutchinson in 1909; this long-standing definition provides:
a stream of water flowing in a definite channel, having a bed and sides or
banks, and discharging itself into some other stream or body of water. The
flow of water need not be constant, but must be more than mere surface
drainage occasioned by extraordinary causes; there must be substantial
indications of the existence of a stream, which is ordinarily a moving body
of water.
Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (quoting Loosli, 66 Idaho at 481, 162 P.2d at 398, in
turn quoting Hutchinson, 16 Idaho at 488, 101 P. at 1061). Thus, for the Court to find a natural
watercourse, there must be (a) “substantial indications of the existence of a stream, which is
ordinarily a moving body of water,” (b) flowing, not necessarily constantly, but more than “mere
surface drainage occasioned by extraordinary causes” (c) in a “definite channel, having a bed and
sides or banks,” (d) that “discharg[es] itself into some other stream or body of water.” Moulton,
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163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (citations omitted). Roberts cannot show any of these
elements because there can be no genuine dispute that the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property is
not a natural watercourse.
First, Roberts has not—and cannot—show that there are “substantial indications” that the
Waste Ditch across the Jensen Property ever existed as a stream, a moving body of water.
Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233. The Waste Ditch was platted as an existing ditch,
not a stream or natural feature. (See R. at 222). A ditch is not a stream. Roberts has admitted
that “the Waste Ditch is not a stream.” (R. at 516 (Response to Admission No. 24)). Without a
stream or similar body of moving water, there can be no natural watercourse.
Second, Roberts cannot show that the flow in the Waste Ditch across the Jensen Property,
if not necessarily constant, is anything more than “mere surface drainage occasioned by
extraordinary causes.” Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (citations omitted). For
instance, while Roberts cannot recall anything specific about prior flooding, she has stated:
Each time this [i.e., the prior, indistinctly recollected instances of
flooding] occurred, heavy rain and rapid melting of snow caused natural
run-off through the drainage area north of Plaintiffs barn and through
Plaintiffs pasture, across her horse arena, and under and across Sunnyside
Drive, into the Jensen’s [sic] and Houdeshells’ property. It then continued
over 500 South through the field to the south, down to 100 West towards
the canyon and the Snake River.
(R. at 506 (Answer No. 12)). The evidence also shows that “[t]here was never a regular flow of
water through the portion of the Waste Ditch located on the Jensen Property,” except “in the rare
instances of a large storm or rapid snow melt.” (R. at 153 (¶ 17). It appears that this flow was
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only occasioned by the flooding instances indistinctly recalled by Roberts, not the more regular
flow necessary to establish a natural watercourse.
Third, Roberts cannot show that water flowed across the Jensen Property in the Waste
Ditch in a “definite channel, having a bed and sides or banks” that occurred naturally. Moulton,
163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (citations omitted). The Waste Ditch may have had a bottom
and ditchbanks, but they did not occur naturally and so cannot form a natural watercourse.
Fourth, Roberts cannot show that the Waste Ditch “discharg[es] itself into some other
stream or body of water.”

Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233 (citations omitted).

There is a low point in the Subdivision, or at least in the area of the Roberts Property and the
Jensen Property, at the location of the culvert under Sunnyside Drive. (See R. at 505 (Answer
No. 9) (“Water continued to run downhill [from the Roberts Property] to the lowest point where
the culvert crosses Sunnyside Drive”)). Larry Bos, who avers to have farmed the Subdivision
(which he refers to as “the property”) prior to its platting, “observed where natural water
drainage and drainage from irrigation runoff ran to the low point on the property. That water …
always flowed down to the lowest point on the property where the culvert is now located
underneath Sunnyside Drive.” (R. at 411). Even a third party unfamiliar with the area can see
that the portion of Sunnyside Drive, the Roberts Property, and the Jensen Property was the low
point of the area, forming a “natural depression of the land” that was not caused by anything the
Jensens did. (R. at 482 (police report of Deputy Spencer). “From that point, the water continued
to flow [through the already-existing Waste Ditch] southwesterly,” where the water would
“ultimately drain into the Snake River Canyon.” (R. at 411). However, the statement is not
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relevant to the determination of a natural watercourse.

stream must directly discharge

and

t0

itself into

another stream 0r body 0f water.

(R. at 152-53, 175, 207).

so.

Whatever extent

it

exists) crosses

still

It

and the

West 500 South,

is

a

common
The

fact that

It is

man—made

ditch.

The

Roberts

(1]

District

existed

a public street south of the

it

watered several large

is

trees

Where

all

the water of a ditch terminates

16.a.).

claiming a natural servitude in the Waste Ditch cannot be

antithetical to the character

sustained.

2.

The presence of large

(R. at 153

feature.

it

see also R. at 256-59 (showing the terminus of the Waste Ditch

at 153, 175;

trees for decades».

The Waste

appears that the Waste Ditch (when

Sunnyside Acres subdivision, and then empties into the ground, Where
copses 0f trees. (R.

to the oceans,

However, to be a natural watercourse under Idaho law, a

those greatest bodies of water.

Ditch does not do

Water “ultimately” drains

0f a natural servitude t0 be located in an

artiﬁcial,

Court correctly determined that the doctrine of natural servitudes does

not apply to this case, because Roberts cannot have an interest in the artiﬁcial and

man—made Waste Ditch
The

District

t0 this case.”

as a natural servitude.

Court ultimately found that “the doctrine 0f natural servitude does not apply

(R. at 707).

Roberts contends that the District Court erred in this determination

because “water had naturally drained and
decades” and “the ditch
drained surface water
Roberts’ contention

is

[i.e.,

the

ﬂowed

to

and through the Jensen [P]roperty for

Waste Ditch] crossing the Jensens’ property had naturally

since at least 2001.”

(Appellant’s Opening Bic, pp. 12-13).

But

an attempt to take the “natural” out of “natural servitudes.” The District

Court was not operating on principles 0f estoppel 0r notice, but held that the only servitude that
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could be enforced under the civil law rule is a natural servitude. (See R. at 707). At the core of
this holding, the District Court pointed to the numerous man-made, artificial, and non-natural
elements of the servitude Roberts was claiming on the Jensen Property:
It is clear that the county road and culvert is a substantial factor as
concerns the inability of water to leave the Roberts property.
It is also undisputed based on the Affidavits of Roberts and Crane who
own the properties north of Sunnyside Drive that the Waste Ditch on their
respective properties were essentially “obliterated”. The natural drainage
of the Roberts property has been altered by Sunnyside Drive and the
failure to maintain the culvert. Sunnyside Drive is an obstruction to the
natural drainage of water from the Roberts property which has resulted in
the accumulation of water on the Roberts’ property. Further, the water
discharged by the culvert, which is an artificial structure, is not discharged
into a watercourse and originally was discharged into a waste ditch which
is an artificial channel. Therefore, the doctrine of natural servitude does
not apply to this case.
(R. at 707 (footnote omitted)). For the District Court, the dispositive facts were that there were
numerous man-made and artificial interferences with any natural servitude. The decision points
to Sunnyside Drive (a county road), the inadequately built or maintained culvert, the obliteration
of the Waste Ditch on the Roberts Property and other upstream landowners (such as Mr. Crane),
and the fact that the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property is an “artificial channel.” (R. at 707). It
is because of all of these undisputed facts that the District Court found that “the doctrine of
natural servitude does not apply to this case.” (R. at 707). The District Court was correct. But
Roberts provides a few arguments against this conclusion, none of which is availing.
First, Roberts argues that she “did not alter her property in any way to ‘accumulate or
concentrate’ the surface water that flowed naturally across her property.” (Appellant’s Opening
Br., p. 13). The Jensens have never argued that Roberts concentrated the flow of surface water.
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However, this attempt to dismiss any discussion of a natural waterway as only applicable to the
exception to the civil law rule misses the point.
Under the civil law rule, a necessary corollary to the natural servitude is that an upper
landowner cannot increase the amount of surface water a lower landowner must accept. See,
e.g., Burgess, 119 Idaho at 305, 805 P.2d at 1229. Typically, this occurs through alterations
made by upper landowner to the upper property. Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233. In
that situation, there is an exception for water discharged into a natural waterway. Id. This is the
point Roberts is arguing against. (See Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 13). But the proposition
stands more generally: an upper landowner cannot force a lower landowner, subject to a natural
servitude, to accept more surface water than naturally flows onto the lower property. See
Moulton, 163 Idaho at 411, 414 P.3d at 233.
Here, in a rare move, Roberts (the upper landowner) has brought a legal action to force
the Jensens (the lower landowners) to make (or sustain) alterations to their property—the lower
property—so that the lower property can receive more surface water than it otherwise would.
This cannot be legally sustained. And, while rare, Roberts is not the first to attempt this tactic.
More than 100 years ago, a landowner in Minnesota (which follows the civil law rule) attempted
this same maneuver. See Schulenberg v. Zimmerman, 86 Minn. 70, 90 N.W. 156 (1902). There,
two landowners “dug a ditch in and along the natural water course … which formed a continuous
drain from plaintiff’s [upper] land to the creek.” Id. at 71, 90 N.W. at 156-57. The lower
landowner later sold his property, and the buyers (the defendants in the case) “filled up the ditch
on their own land, and thereby raised the natural surface of the water course, which prevented the
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flow of the waters through the ditch or water course, and caused them to set back upon the
plaintiff's land, where they remain, with no way of escape.” Id. at 71-72, 90 N.W. at 157. In
filling the ditch, the defendant “was not … filled any higher than the natural water course,” and
affected an “approximate restoration of the water course to its natural condition.” Id. at 72-73,
90 N.W. at 157. The upper landowner then sued to force the lower landowner to clear the ditch
and allow water to drain as it had for “more than 25 years.” Id. at 71, 90 N.W. at 156. However,
the Supreme Court of Minnesota reasoned compellingly that:
Before the bed of the water course was lowered by the construction of
the ditch, the plaintiff had no right to do anything to make the natural
servitude on the defendants’ land more onerous. If he has acquired
any right to do so, it must have been by grant or by prescription, or
on principles of equitable estoppel.
Id. at 73, 90 N.W. at 157. The Schulenberg Court found no indication of an easement and no
basis to apply principles of estoppel. Id. For that reason, the Schulenberg Court affirmed the
dismissal of plaintiff’s case. Id. This is in keeping with the reasoning of the Idaho Court of
Appeals, which noted that in order to acquire any rights beyond the scope of a natural easement,
an upper landowner “must establish an easement, by prescription or agreement.” Merrill v.
Penrod, 109 Idaho 46, 53-54, 704 P.2d 950, 957-58 (1985).
Just as in Schulenberg, Roberts (and her predecessors-in-interest in the Roberts Property)
“had no right to do anything to make the natural servitude on the [Jensen Property] more
onerous.” Schulenberg, 86 Minn. at 73, 90 N.W. at 157; see also Merrill, 109 Idaho at 53-54,
704 P.2d at 957-58. If she has acquired the right to do so, it must be under an easement or other
theory, which Roberts has not preserved on appeal. A natural servitude only empowers an upper
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landowner
servitude

to

by

enforce the preservation of natural drainage on the lower land; a natural

itself

does not allow an upper landowner to protect any artiﬁcial drainage 0n

The Waste Ditch

lower land.

an artiﬁcial feature that

is

may enhance

the drainage across the

Jensen Property—but any natural servitude Roberts beneﬁts from does not give her any rights in

enhancement.

that artiﬁcial

And

Roberts has not raised any issues of easement 0r estoppel 0n

appeal.

Because Roberts’

interest in

the natural drainage, she has

Waste Ditch up
in excess

0f the

109 Idaho
in the

n0 claim against the Jensens

to its natural level.

civil

any natural servitude on the Jensen Property

at 73,

90 N.W.

at 157.

Any right

law rule (or the exception) must be obtained by an easement. See Merrill,

Waste Ditch, Roberts has n0 basis

to include the

limited t0 just

t0 the extent the Jensens ﬁlled the

See Schulenberg, 86 Minn.

53-54, 704 P.2d at 957-58.

at

is

Because Roberts has waived any claim
t0 force the Jensen Property to

t0

an easement

be artiﬁcially conﬁgured

Waste Ditch.

Roberts has never disputed that in 2013, the Jensens ﬁlled in the Waste Ditch and
“level[ed]

it

off with the surrounding land,” and thereby “did not increase the grade, gradient,

elevation, 0r level 0f the Jensen Property.”

showing what the Jensen Property looked

(R. at 156, 208).

like before the

Jensens restored the Jensen Property as close t0
to this fact has repeatedly

been

the bottom outlet of the culvert

its

However, there

Waste Ditch

is

existed.

“approximately three (3) feet higher than

0n the Jensens’ property.” (Appellant’s Opening
There

is

In short, the

natural state as they could. Roberts’ response

t0 assert that this ﬁll is

24, 27; see also R. at 539, 542, 548).

no evidence

no reference

to the natural state
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Bic, pp. 4, 15,

0f the Jensen

Property, because Roberts is not interested in the natural state. The natural servitude is now the
only legal theory Roberts has left to claim any sort of interest in the Waste Ditch.
Exhibit A attached to Appellant’s Opening Brief illustrates Roberts’ disregard for the
natural topography described in the evidence presented. Based on a survey and topographical
analysis conducted on Roberts’ behalf, she has now shown a contour map of the area of the
Roberts Property and the Jensen Property. The low points—the enclosed areas showing 3586
feet of elevation (inside which is even lower)—center on Sunnyside Drive.

(Appellant’s

Opening Br., Ex. A). The road itself goes down into the low point, as indicated by the contour
lines on the east and west sides the road successively pointing inward to the low point on the
road. (Appellant’s Opening Br., Ex. A). This indicates that Sunnyside Drive crests one small
hill, descends into the low point shown on the contour map, and then goes up another small hill
on the other side. (Appellant’s Opening Br., Ex. A). This is in line with the testimony of Larry
Bos, who said that before the Subdivision existed, his “father farmed the property for many
years.”

(R. at 410).

Apparently, to Mr. Bos, the “property” is equivalent to the entire

subdivision. (See R. at 410). Mr. Bos states that the “water … always flowed down to the
lowest point on the property where the culvert is now located underneath Sunnyside Drive.” (R.
at 411). From there, it appears that the water would flow south, through the Waste Ditch. (R. at
411 (describing the course of the Waste Ditch); see also R. at 256-59 (depicting the course of the
Waste Ditch through the years)). Looking at the location of the Waste Ditch (marked as the “Fill
area” on Roberts’ Exhibit A), it appears to go through a relatively steep ravine between two very
small hillocks. (Appellant’s Opening Br., Ex. A). There is no evidence showing whether those
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two hillocks were previously one ridge, but even if it never was, the uncontroverted testimony
shows that the Jensens leveled the Jensen Property. Whatever water passes naturally may pass,
but they are not required to allow a ditch to augment the flow of water. The low point in the area
is “now located underneath Sunnyside Drive” (R. at 411) and extends to the north and the south.
(Appellant’s Opening Br., Ex. A). This is the area that flooded in 2017. (See R. at 182-87, 19395).
Roberts’ second argument against the District Court’s holding is that she “did not install
the county road or the culvert,” and that “the Jensens acquired their land burdened with this
servitude,” and the Court should focus on “the actions take by the Jensens in 2013.” (Appellant’s
Opening Br., p. 14). But none of this matters. While Roberts would like the focus to be on the
Jensens in 2013, their actions on their own property are entirely proper—and Roberts has no
claim for damages—unless Roberts can first establish a valid legal interest in the Waste Ditch on
the Jensen Property. See City of Bellevue, 14 Idaho at ____, 94 P. at 1038 (“every man has a
right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, and if while lawfully in such use and
enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable loss occurs to his neighbor,
it is ‘damnum absque injuria,’ for the rightful use of one's own land may cause damage to
another without any legal wrong” (citation omitted)).
Thus, before the Court can even consider anything the Jensens did in 2013, Roberts must
show a legally-recognized interest in the Waste Ditch. Below, Roberts argued under both
easement and natural servitude theories and both were dismissed. On appeal, Roberts only
argues for a natural servitude. For the reasons explained here, Roberts cannot establish a natural
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servitude through the artiﬁcial

Waste Ditch on

the Jensen Property. For that reason, in 2013, the

Jensens naturally used and enjoyed their property Without negligence or malice (neither of Which

has ever even been alleged), and almost four years

ﬂooded

after

rightful use

later,

extreme weather and circumstances—“it

own

of one's

Bellevue, 14 Idaho at

is

the Roberts Property unavoidably

‘damnum absque

injuria,’

for the

land

may

cause damage t0 another Without any legal wrong.” City 0f

94

P. at

1038 (citation omitted).

,

Third, Roberts maintains that “the culvert does not ‘discharge’ water onto the Jensen

[P]r0perty.”

(Appellant’s Opening Bic, p. 15).

Again,

it

does not matter What terminology

used t0 describe water coming out 0f the culvert under Sunnyside Drive.
well below the natural surface level of the ground.

(showing the culvert invert
point of land

is

at

all

culvert itself

is

(See Appellant’s Opening Br., EX.

A

3583.7, while the lowest contour line

to

by Roberts—all

stand for the principle that an upper landowner can

make

Having made changes 0n her own property, Roberts

is

recognize a natural servitude through a culvert under a road and
agrees

3586, meaning n0 other

was abandoned by

owner (See Appellant’s Opening

its

Teeter, Dayley,

deal with the exception to the civil law rule.

property t0 concentrate surface water into a natural watercourse.
here.

is

lower than 3585.5, as the contour lines are 05-foot contours)).

and Smith—the cases pointed

They

The

is

artiﬁcial

That

is

changes 0n his

not What

is

own

happening

attempting t0 force others4 to

down

a ditch that Roberts

Br., p. 28, n. 8).

now

Roberts’ appeal

As noted in the Jensens’ Rule 12(b)(7) Motion, which was not addressed, as the Jensens prevailed on summary
judgment, Roberts’ claims Will affect numerous other individuals (including Jerome County and other
landowners in the

area),

Who

should not be

left

out 0f this decision, with the far-reaching effects of the

declaratory judgment sought.
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to use a natural servitude to create an interest in artificial constructions not on her own property
cannot prevail.
Roberts argues that “the district court misapplied Idaho’s ‘civil law’ rule for a natural
servitude and effectively created a situation that leaves Roberts with no remedy but to fight
future flood water as a ‘common enemy.’ Since Idaho has rejected the ‘common enemy’ rule,
this Court should reverse.”

(Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 12).

This argument is incorrect

because, as previously explained, there is such a thing as damage without injury. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 1955, Appx. A (11th ed. 2019) (defining Damnum absque injuria esse potest); see
also City of Bellevue, 14 Idaho at ____, 94 P. at 1038 (applying this maxim). In the specific
context of natural servitudes, “[t]he fact that there is no natural outlet from the servient tenement
does not relieve it from receiving water falling on the dominant tenement.” 93 C.J.S. Waters, §
257 (footnote omitted). As Roberts has stated: Aqua currit, et debet currere, ut solebat ex jure
naturae. (Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 8). Thus, under the civil law rule, everyone has a right to
convey water to lower land, even if that lower land lies in a hollow surrounded by higher land (as
the Roberts Property or, more properly, the culvert under Sunnyside Drive, does).
In sum, Roberts still has not provided any basis for the Court to find that a natural
servitude exists through the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property. This Court must affirm the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the Jensens’ behalf.
B. The District Court correctly granted the Jensens’ motion for summary judgment and
the dismissal of Roberts’ Amended Complaint with prejudice must be affirmed.
While the key question in the appeal is what right Roberts has in the Waste Ditch on the
Jensen Property (and the answer is “none”), procedurally the District Court granted the Jensens
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summary judgment and dismissed
actions

the claims in Roberts’

must be afﬁrmed, foremost, because the

Amended Complaint

District Court

natural servitude does not apply t0 this case” (R. at 707),

However, the

other claims for nuisance or trespass.

alternative ground.

Speciﬁcally, there

is

was

that she cannot sustain her

Court can be afﬁrmed on an

no genuine dispute of material

fact

and the Jensens

remain entitled to judgment as a matter 0f law, because they cannot be held

damages caused by an Act 0f God, such
Because Roberts has no

1.

as the

2017 ﬂooding

interest in the

Jensens acted Within their rights in ﬁlling

These

correct that “the doctrine of

meaning

District

(R. at 713).

at issue.

liable for

Idaho R. CiV. P. 56(a).

Waste Ditch 0n the Jensen Property,
it

in

any

the

and Roberts cannot sustain Nuisance 0r

Trespass claims against the Jensens.

Roberts recognizes that her nuisance and trespass claims are dependent on the validity 0f
her interest in the Waste Ditch under the doctrine 0f natural servitudes.
Br., p. 8 (claiming that “Jensens’

servitude

(Appellant’s Opening

wrongful actions in 2013 interfered with Roberts’ natural

damaging her property. Consequently, Roberts has valid nuisance and trespass claims”

(citation omitted,

interest in the

emphasis added»; see also id, pp. 29, 34).

Waste Ditch

Roberts

has—and can have—no

as a natural servitude for the reasons explained above.

she cannot prevail on either her nuisance or trespass claims. Nevertheless, each

some

is

As

a result,

addressed in

additional detail below.

As

to the nuisance claim, the District

Idaho Code

§

Complaint.

(R. at 14, 390).

42-1207, since that

statutory claim under §

is

Court correctly found that

What was

in Roberts” original

As Roberts has abandoned her claim

42-1207 (Appellant’s Opening

it

was based only on

Complaint and Amended
to

an easement and the

Brief, p. 28, n. 8), that issue is
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still

resolved. And it is the only basis in Roberts’ Amended Complaint for the nuisance. (R. at 390).
But Roberts now, as at the hearing on summary judgment, relies on a notice pleading standard to
bootstrap a “private nuisance” claim. (Tr. at 15:2-10; see also Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 28).
However, this claim is still dependent on the existence of Roberts’ interest in the Waste Ditch.
(Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 28 (“Roberts alleged a nuisance claim on the basis of the
established natural servitude”)). Even accepting Roberts’ tenuous notice pleading argument, this
is in keeping with the pleading’s language. (R. at 390 (claiming that “Roberts is entitled to an
injunction enjoining or abating the continued blockage of the waste ditch and/or the natural
servitude on the Jensen Property [i.e., the Waste Ditch])). Therefore, to reiterate, this claim must
fall along with Roberts’ claim to a natural servitude in an artificial ditch. It is worth re-quoting
that this Court has held, in the context of a nuisance claim, that:
Generally, “every man may regulate, improve, and control his own
property, may make such erections as his own judgment, taste, or interest
may suggest, and be master of his own without dictation or interference by
his neighbors, so long as the use to which he devotes his property is not in
violation of the rights of others, however much damage they may
sustain therefrom.”
McVicars, 156 Idaho at 62, 320 P.3d at 952 (quoting White, 41 Idaho at 669–70, 241 P. at 368)
(emphasis added).
As to the trespass claim, it must likewise fall with the Roberts’ claim to a natural
servitude in an artificial ditch, as it is predicated in that interest on the Jensen Property. (See
Appellant’s Opening Br., pp. 31, 33). However, even beyond this simple disposition lies a
murky question of law. Both Mock and Mueller (the cases cited by Roberts), as well as all the
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other Idaho authority 0n point that counsel for the Jensens have seen, involve a situation where

the excess water (0r noise) that caused a trespass

Mueller

v.

Hill,

came from

the trespasser’s propertv. See

158 Idaho 208, 211—12, 345 P.3d 998, 1001—02 (2015) (“The bulldozer work

lowered the grade of the driveway by cutting into the uphill slope, ﬁlling in the downhill slope,
adding a substantial amount of

ﬁll,

and increasing the Width of the driveway. The construction

caused a substantial amount of water runoff to be diverted onto the Mueller Parcel”);

Mock

v.

Potlatch Corp, 786 F. Supp. 1545, 1546 (D. Idaho 1992) (describing the noise complained of

coming from cleaning a turbine 0n the defendant’s property and,

ultimately, dismissing the

trespass portion 0f the complaint).

The invasion complained of in a
Mock, 786

F.

Supp.

at

trespass action

1548 (emphasis added).

must “involve[] an entry onto the land.”

Both terms, invasion and

entry, include the

concept 0f something not 0n the property going (by action 0f the defendant) onto the property.
See, e.g., 75

Am.

Jur.

2d Trespass

§ 41

(“A physical invasion of the property of another

accomplished by the casting 0f substances 0r objects 0n the
borders”); see also id,

comment (“The

interest in exclusive possession

actor,

plaintiff’s property

Without entering the land,

may

by throwing, propelling, 0r placing a thing

may be

from outside

its

invade another’s

either

on or beneath

the surface of the land, or into the air space above it” (emphasis added»; see also 75

Trespass § 43 (“The concept 0f trespass includes a trespass caused by water.

Am.

Jur.

2d

However,

because a trespass to real property requires the intentional entry onto the land of another, ﬂoods
resulting

from a severe storm do not constitute a

trespass”).

trespass requires an intentional invasion 0r entry onto the

The general

principle

is

that

land—Which Roberts cannot show.
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See Mock, 786 F. Supp. at 1548. For this reason, the trespass cases in Idaho involving flooding
have been brought by the affected party against the person who diverted or caused the water to
go upon the property. See Utter v. Gibbons, 137 Idaho 361, 48 P.3d 1250 (2002) (where upper
landowners trespassed by diverting water onto lower landowners’ land without authorization);
see also Bradford v. Simpson, 98 Idaho 830, 573 P.2d 149 (1978); Kirby v. Scotton, 163 Idaho
551, 415 P.3d 960 (Ct. App. 2018); Verheyen v. Dewey, 27 Idaho 1, 146 P. 1116 (1915) (in a
claim for trespass based on flooding and seepage from a canal system, but holding that a
defendant could not be held liable for damages from natural floods).
Here, the excess water did not come from the Jensen Property. (R. at 515 (Response to
Admission Nos. 19 and 20, where Roberts admitted that “the water that flooded the Roberts
Property during and as a result of the Flood did not come from the Jensen Property” or “from the
Jensens”)). It clearly came from the land above the Roberts Property. The District Court pointed
this out and posited that where the elements of trespass could not be met, the appropriate cause
of action may be negligence. (R. at 711-12).

However, Roberts did not bring a negligence

claim or seek leave to amend her Amended Complaint to include a negligence claim.
It is for this reason that Roberts argues that the law should be expanded to allow a
trespass claim for interference with a natural servitude. (Appellant’s Opening Br., pp. 33-34).
Roberts argues that this situation is like riparian landowners. (Appellant’s Opening Br., pp. 3334). But this case illustrates exactly why it is not the law. Here, Roberts seeks to create a natural
servitude through an artificial ditch on a claimed downhill property. Aside from the issues of
how many natural servitudes such a holding would create in the vast number of ditches and
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canals throughout the state of Idaho, Roberts

now

seeks t0 import jurisprudence from riparian

lands to these ditch relationships. In fact, Roberts (at least) tacitly admits that the Waste Ditch

is

not a natural watercourse, but in the context 0f her trespass claim, wants to import principles of
riparian

law when

it is

convenient. Ditch rights and riparian rights have developed separately for

decades and even centuries.

Roberts

now

combine the two. The Court should not do

seeks t0 have the Court build a bridge in order t0

Rather than expanding the law to accommodate

so.

Roberts’ oversight and mistake, the Court must—regardless of

servitude

2.

question—afﬁrm the dismissal of Roberts”

Even

if

determines the natural

trespass claim.

afﬁrm the

District Court’s holding

basis that the Jensens are not liable under the

Act 0f God

This Court has observed that “[W]e can afﬁrm the

76 (2016)

it

Roberts could, for some reason, maintain nuisance 0r trespass claims against

the Jensens, this Court should

judgment on

how

alternate grounds.”

Kugler

(citation omitted). This is

v.

on the

alternative

doctrine.

district court’s

order granting

summary

Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 412—13, 374 P.3d 571, 575—

because

“it is well-settled that

‘[W]here an order of a lower court

is correct,

but

based 0n an erroneous theory, the order will be afﬁrmed upon the correct
”
theory.’
Kuhn v. Caldwell Banker Landmark, Ina, 150 Idaho 240, 248,
245 P.3d 992, 1000 (2010) (quoting Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,
459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984)); Curlee v. Kootenai Cnly. Fire &
Rescue, 148 Idaho 391, 397, 224 P.3d 458, 464 (2008) (considering, for
ﬁrst time on appeal, defendant's alternate theory in support of summary

judgment). Consequently, even
court erred in granting

function exception,
exception.

We

we

if this

Court determines that the

summary judgment based upon

could afﬁrm the judgment based upon the design

Will therefore consider both exceptions

Whether the City

is

district

the discretionary

immune from

liability.
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When determining

Grabicki v. City of Lewiston, 154 Idaho 686, 692, 302 P.3d 26, 32 (2013). Thus, here, separate
and independent of the issues with Roberts’ claimed natural servitude, all of the damages
claimed by Roberts were, as a matter of law, the result of an Act of God (also known as an Act
of Nature, Act of Providence, Superior Force, Irresistible Force, Force Majeure, Vis Major,
and/or Vis Divina) for which the Jensens cannot be held liable. That issue was squarely raised
below (R. at 655-56), and Roberts responded to it (R. at 671), while the District Court did not
need to reach the argument. But this Court may affirm on the basis of this theory.
In Idaho, “[t]he term ‘Act of God’ … has reference to those events and accidents which
proceed from natural causes and cannot be anticipated or guarded against or resisted.” Harper v.
Johannesen, 84 Idaho 278, 286, 371 P.2d 842, 846 (1962); see also Rice v. Oregon Short Line R.
Co., 33 Idaho 565, ____, 198 P. 161, 164 (1921). Even damages that are caused by a flood, “[i]f
the damage sustained by the plaintiff was due to vis major, or act of God, the plaintiff cannot
recover, such being recognized in the law as a defense. … If such a flow would not have been
anticipated by a reasonably prudent man, then such a flood would be considered such an
extraordinary flow of water as to amount to an Act of God.” Harper, 84 Idaho at 286-87, 371
P.2d at 846-47 (italics in original); see also Curtis v. Dewey, 93 Idaho 847, 849, 475 P.2d 808,
810 (1970) (also applying the Act of God defense in an action predicated on flooding). As one
example of what would constitute an Act of God, this Court has proffered:
If it appeared in this case that this was such a heavy and unprecedented
rainfall as had not occurred within the memory of man, as that term is
defined by law, then certainly the [defendant] would not be liable. Such an
act would properly be classed as the act of God for which there is no
liability.
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Willson

t0

v.

Boise City, 20 Idaho 133,

_, 117

An Act 0f God does not have

P. 115, 118 (191 1).

be the extreme example of “such a heavy and unprecedented

Within the

memory 0f man,”

rainfall as

but that such hyperbole was an example.

had not occurred
(holding that

Id.

it

depends on whether disasters “have occurred with sufﬁcient frequency” for them to be “classed

among

the

phenomenal or unprecedented outpourings of nature” or

not).

This

is

obviously

consistent With the deﬁnition 0f Act 0f God provided in Harper.

Despite being provided with Harper’s deﬁnition 0f “Act of
association With a request for admission (R. at 495 (footnote

1),

God”

speciﬁcally in

Roberts—when pressed

t0

explain the facts underlying her denial pursuant t0 the Jensens’ other discovery requests—still

never provided a basis for her denial because Roberts, despite being provided with the deﬁnition

0f “Act of God” in Harper, was for some reason unable t0 de-couple the stated deﬁnition from
the religious implication of the term

Roberts’ explanation

itself.

Request fur Admission No. 8 was denied

is

as follows:

for the fallowing reasons.

Without being ﬂippant

or disrespectﬁll, Plaintiff does not believe in a Gad, and notwithstanding Defendant’s deﬁnition

of“act of God”, Plaintiff denied Request for Admission No.8. Justas a one-hundred year ﬂood or

a ﬁve-hundred year ﬂood may be out of the ondinary, each 0f those events would
natural causes that are neither caused nor sanctiorled

hundred years

i5

FEMA

anticipates that

locations and area of impact.

Plaintiff had

(R. at

deity.

classiﬁad as an intermediate regional

Management Agency C‘FEMA”).
ﬂood.

by a

A

thwe Events
However,

n0 choice but t0 deny this

526 (Response N0. 15 relating

to

car:

111$)!

and

is

will (accur,

from

A5 an example, a ﬂood of une—

ﬂood by The

ﬁve—hundred year ﬂood

result

Federal Emergency

referred t0 as a standard project

and takes steps to identify

their

are naturally occurring events. Consequenﬂy, the

request.

Request for Admission N0.
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8)).

In any event, despite Roberts’ unwillingness to engage with the legal definition of an
“Act of God,” she has not—and cannot—dispute any fact showing that whatever damages
occurred were the result of an Act of God. “Each interrogatory must, to the extent it is not
objected to, be answered separately and fully in writing under oath.” Idaho R. Civ. P. 33(b)(3).
Thus, Roberts’ above response provides her “identif[ication] and descri[ption] in detail [of] the
bases in fact and law for [her] denial” of Request for Admission No. 8. (R. at 492 (Interrogatory
No. 15)). Roberts also never provided any document supporting her FEMA-themed assertions.
(R. at 494 (Request for Production No. 14)).

Nevertheless, there are no facts in Roberts’

response that negate the Jensens’ Act of God defense.
On February 10, 2017, C.L. “Butch” Otter, Governor of the State of Idaho, signed
Proclamation No. ID-02-2017, proclaiming and declaring a “disaster emergency described in
Section 46-1008, Idaho Code” to exist “arising from excessive flooding.”

(R. at 296). On

February 13, 2017, the Governor added Jerome County to that “disaster emergency.” (R. at
297). This was been renewed monthly for many months. (See R. at 298-314; see also R. at 47578). This continuation means (1) that the Governor has not found “that the threat or danger has
passed, or the disaster has been dealt with to the extent that emergency conditions no longer
exist,” but has in fact found (repeatedly) that the “disaster emergency” should be continued for
another month. Idaho Code § 46-1008(2). It is quite a flooding disaster that maintained a state
disaster emergency proclamation for almost a year and a half.
The February 2017 flooding in Jerome County was so extreme that it even warranted
attention even beyond the State of Idaho. On April 21, 2017, “President Donald J. Trump signed
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for 11 southern Idaho counties [including

a Presidential Disaster Declaration

Jerome County],

damaged

triggering the release of federal funds t0 help communities repair public infrastructure

by severe Winter storms and

related

ﬂooding from February 5 through March

3.”

(R. at 320; see

also R. at 322-324 (showing the federal disaster declaration in the Federal Register».

extreme ﬂooding

is

the subj ect of both state and federal disaster declarations.

This extraordinary ﬂooding in 2017

is

unprecedented. Roberts has asserted that she has

“previously observed other similar ﬂooding events that occurred prior.” (R. at 389).

When asked

This

to specify

and provide

details

However,

about these supposedly “similar ﬂooding events,”

Roberts “only recalls that there were two prior years during Which ﬂooding events occurred”

when

the

ﬂooding did not impact her as much as

recollection of the exact years

When

in 2017, but she “has

those two events occurred.”

Such un-memorable events cannot provide a comparable event
disaster declaration

half—still being

and a

(“M”)

this,

by

8)).

“anticipates” a one-hundred-year

This assertion

in

ﬂood

was—even

12)).

that elicited a federal

after

almost a year and a

Roberts primarily asserts that the Federal Emergency Management Agency

by an “Act of God” 0r
ﬂooding

t0 a

525 (Answer N0.

a reasonable person.

are “naturally occurring events”).

N0.

proclamation that

(R. at

indelible

renewed by the governor. The 2017 ﬂood was unprecedented and could not be

anticipated 0r resisted

Against

state disaster

n0 independent

is

(R. at

ﬂood and

a ﬁve-hundred-year

526 (Answer No. 15

relating to

ﬂood (even

The relevant question

is

they

Request for Admission

also not relevant to the determination of whether the

not.

if

ﬂood was caused

Whether the water ﬂows that caused the

February 2017 “would not have been anticipated by a reasonably prudent man,
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then such a flood would be considered such an extraordinary flow of water as to amount to an
Act of God.” Harper, 84 Idaho at 287, 371 P.2d at 847 (emphasis added); see also Curtis, 93
Idaho at 849, 475 P.2d at 810. FEMA is an agency that is tasked with dealing with and
managing emergencies. It is not surprising that FEMA would have some idea where a onehundred-year flood or even a five-hundred-year flood can occur. However, FEMA’s projections
of potential emergencies have absolutely no bearing on what can be “anticipated by a reasonably
prudent [person].” Harper, 84 Idaho at 287, 371 P.2d at 847. It is clear that a reasonably
prudent person does not anticipate, prepare for, or prevent even a one-hundred-year flood. See
Willson, 20 Idaho at ____, 117 P. at 118 (considering how often an event has happened within
“15 or 20 years”). Even the deputy chief of the Idaho Office of Emergency Management
(Idaho’s state FEMA analog), said “[t]he destruction caused by all this water is breathtaking in
its scope and magnitude.” (R. at 320). If the 2017 flooding was “breathtaking” to Idaho’s
emergency agency, neither the Jensens nor anyone else could not have stopped it.
Simply, what has been declared an extraordinary disaster by the Governor of the State of
Idaho (and was an ongoing disaster for many months thereafter) and the President of the United
States is an “event[] and accident[] which proceed[ed] from natural causes and cannot be
anticipated or guarded against or resisted.” Harper, 84 Idaho at 286, 371 P.2d at 846. In other
words, the flooding in February 2017 was an Act of God, which—regardless of the Court
determination of Roberts’ natural servitude interest in the Waste Ditch—provides an absolute
defense to all of Roberts’ claims for damages. On that alternative basis, this Court can affirm.
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C. The Brockway Affidavits are immaterial because Roberts has no interest in the Jensen
Property and cannot show a trespass or nuisance, therefore there is no error.
An issue throughout this litigation has been causation. As described above, the Jensens
believe that—even independent of the fact that Roberts cannot have a natural servitude in the
Waste Ditch—any flood damage to Roberts was caused by an “Act of God.” While providing
responses to discovery requests regarding these issues that miss the point of the legal doctrine,
Roberts attempted to have several lay witnesses attempted to opine as to causation, which was
correctly struck by the District Court and not appealed by Roberts. (R. at 698-700). Eventually
(and still ignoring whether Roberts had a legal interest in the Waste Ditch or whether flooding
was an “Act of God”), Roberts submitted an affidavit from Dr. Brockway that provided expert
testimony centering on causation. (R. at 535-43). The expert opinions of Dr. Brockway (and
Dr. Christensen) were both excluded as “speculative” and unhelpful to the trier of fact because
“the evidence indicates that the culvert under Sunnyside Drive is unable to adequately covey
water off of Roberts’ property when there is excessive rain fall or snow or snow melt,” as
occurred in 2017. (R. at 703).
First, any error made with regard to excluding the experts’ opinions is harmless and does
not entitle Roberts to any relief on appeal, because Dr. Brockway’s opinions are immaterial since
the Jensens must prevail on the issue of the natural servitude, as described above. See Idaho R.
Civ. P. 56(a) (requiring summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact”). “[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's
case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho 890, 893, 120
P.3d 278, 281 (2005) (citations omitted, brackets in original). Here, the essential element is

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF—PAGE 39

Roberts’ interest in the Waste Ditch on the Jensen Property, which is recognized by Roberts.
(See Appellant’s Opening Br., p. 8 (note the use of the causal “consequently”)). Because Roberts
has no interest in the Waste Ditch—as a natural servitude, as claimed on appeal, or otherwise—
the issue of causation is rendered immaterial. See City of Bellevue, 14 Idaho at ____, 94 P. at
1038 (“every man has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, and if while
lawfully in such use and enjoyment, without negligence or malice on his part, an unavoidable
loss occurs to his neighbor, it is ‘damnum absque injuria,’ for the rightful use of one's own land
may cause damage to another without any legal wrong” (citation omitted)).

Because the

testimony is immaterial, any error in striking it is harmless and should not be considered.
Second, regardless of the circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
excluding the expert testimony. As this Court has recently explained:
When this Court reviews an alleged abuse of discretion by a trial court the
sequence of inquiry requires consideration of four essentials. Whether the
trial court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted
within the outer boundaries of its discretion; (3) acted consistently with
the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and
(4) reached its decision by the exercise of reason.
Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863, 421 P.3d at 194 (emphasis in original). Here, the District Court
properly exercised its discretion. It understood that the decision was one of discretion. (R. at
703 (“This Court may …”)). It acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion by excluding
all of the expert opinions. (R. at 703). It identified the correct legal standards. (R. at 703 (citing
Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, 538, 348 P.3d 145, 153 (2014); Karlson v. Harris, 140 Idaho
561, 565, 97 P.3d 428 ,432 (2004); Bromley v. Garey, 132 Idaho 807, 811, 979 P.2d 1165, 1169
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Finally, the District Court reached
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Brockway’s opinion was speculative rests 0n the fact that he analyzed the situation after the Jensens ﬁlled in the
Waste Ditch, but only provided speculation regarding the situation before that action. Under that circumstance,
the District Court found any inference speculative and unwarranted, and therefore correctly excluded Dr.
Brockway’s opinion.
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D. The Jensens are entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code
§ 12-121 as this appeal has been pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without
foundation because Roberts can have no interest in the Waste Ditch, which undermines
all of her claims and arguments.
“In any civil action, the judge may award reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing
party or parties when the judge finds that the case was brought, pursued or defended frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.” Idaho Code § 12-121. This includes on attorney’s fees on
appeal. Bergeman v. Select Portfolio Servicing, 164 Idaho 498, ____, 432 P.3d 47, 51–52
(2018). This Court has explained:
Where an appeal turns on questions of law, [as it does here], an award of
attorney fees under this section is proper if the law is well-settled and the
appellant has made no substantial showing that the district court
misapplied the law. When an appeal simply disputes the trial court’s
factual findings, which are supported by substantial although conflicting
evidence, the appeal is considered frivolous and an award of attorney fees
is proper under I.C. § 12-121. “[A]n award under I.C. § 12-121 is
appropriate where an appeal presents no meaningful issue on a question of
law but simply invites the appellate court to second-guess the trial judge
on conflicting evidence.”
Lanham v. Fleenor, 164 Idaho 355, 365, 429 P.3d 1231, 1241 (2018) (citation omitted, internal
citations omitted from original, brackets in original)).
This is a civil action. For the reasons explained above, the Jensens must prevail—in that
this Court must affirm the District Court, and allow the Jensens to act lawfully on their own
property without allowing Roberts to inveigle an interest on the Jensen Property. For that
reason, the Jensens are entitled to their costs. Roberts’ appeal has been pursued “frivolously,
unreasonably or without foundation.” Idaho Code § 12-121. The law in this regard is wellsettled in Idaho and other states that have accepted the civil law rule, and just from the name
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